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After the "Peace Process:" Israel,
Palestine, and Regional Nuclear War
Louis Rene Beres*
I. Introduction
An ironic connection exists between the so-called Middle East
Peace Process1 and the risks of regional nuclear war. Although the
creation of Palestine from the Israeli lands of Judea, Samaria (West
Bank) and Gaza is widely expected to reduce tensions and prevent
conflict, its more likely effect will be to encourage both war and
terrorism Indeed, if expanding violence were left to escalate, the
* Ph.D. Princeton (1971); Professor of Political Science and International
Law at Purdue University. Professor Beres is the author of fourteen books and
several hundred articles in professional journals. In Israel, his work is well-known
to the current Prime Minister and to the senior general staff of the Israel Defense
Forces (IDF). Professor Beres lectures frequently in Europe, Israel, and the
United States on strategic and jurisprudential matters.
1. As a jurisprudential aside, the Oslo Agreements upon which this process
is founded are null and void according to international law. All states are
obligated by international law to seek out and to prosecute the perpetrators of
crimes of war, crimes against peace, crimes against, humanity and crimes of
terrorism. See, e.g., Draft Code of Offenses Against the Peace and Security of
Mankind, U.N. GAOR, 9th Sess., Supp. 9 U.N. Doc. A/2693 (1954). Derived from
the peremptory norm of Nullum crimen sine poena, "No crime without a
punishment," this obligation has been violated flagrantly by Israel's agreement
with the terrorist organization, Palestine Liberation Organization. Indeed,
recognizing that, according to Article 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, any agreement "is void, if at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with
a peremptory norm of general international law," the Oslo Agreements should be
abrogated. Conflicting with a peremptory or jus cogens norm-a norm that,
according to Article 53 of the Vienna Convention-is "a norm accepted and
recognized by the international community of states as a whole from which no
derogation is permitted ... ," the agreements confer no jurisprudential responsibi-
lities upon Israel of any kind. See Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties,
opened for signature May 23, 1969, art. 53, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 344.
2. Terrorism is a "conglomerate" crime under international law. For current
conventions in force on this crime, see Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons, Including
Diplomatic Agents, Dec. 14, 1973, 28 U.S.T. 1975, 1035 U.N.T.S. 167; Vienna
Convention on Diplomatic Relations and Optional Protocol on Disputes, Apr. 18,
1961, 23 U.S.T. 3227, 500 U.N.T.S. 95; Convention on Offenses and Certain Other
Acts Committed on Board Aircraft, Sept. 14, 1963, 20 U.S.T. 2941, 704 U.N.T.S.
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creation of Palestine could even spawn the use or exchange of
nuclear weapons.
Why is this the case? First, it is likely, that Israel, feeling more
threatened by its loss of buffer territory, will feel increasingly
compelled to bring its bomb out of the "basement., 3 Here, fearing
that its expanded need for a credible deterrent were no longer
served by the nuclear posture of "deliberate ambiguity," Israel
would probably move to some form of explicit declaration of
nuclear capability. Such disclosure could be full or partial and
could be carried out with or without appropriate public demonstra-
tions or tests.
Whether or not such a shift from ambiguity to disclosure would
actually enhance Israeli deterrence would depend upon several
complex factors, including the types of weapons involved, the
reciprocal calculations of Arab or Iranian leaders,4 the effects upon
rational decision-making processes by these Islamic leaders, and the
effects upon both Israeli and enemy command/control/communi-
cations operations. If, for example, bringing the Israeli bomb out
of the basement were to result in Arab or Iranian pre-delegations
of launch authority and/or new launch-on-warning procedures,' the
219; Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, Dec. 16,
1970, 22 U.S.T. 1641, 860 U.N.T.S. 105; Convention for the Suppression of
Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation, Sept. 23, 1971, 24 U.S.T. 564,
974 U.N.T.S. 177, reprinted in 10 I.L.M. 1151; International Convention Against
Taking of Hostages, opened for signature Dec. 17, 1979, T.I.A.S. No. 11,081, 18
I.L.M. 1456; and European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, opened
for signature Jan 27, 1977, Europ. T.S. No. 90, 15 I.L.M. 1272 (entered into force
Aug. 4, 1978).
3. See Louis Ren6 Beres, Israel's Bomb in the Basement: A Revisiting of
'Deliberate Ambiguity' vs. 'Disclosure,' 2 ISR. AFF. 112 (Autumn 1995).
4. See Louis Ren6 Beres, Israel, Iran and Preemption: Choosing the Least
Unattractive Option Under International Law, 14 DICK. J. INT'L L. 187 (1996);
Louis Ren6 Beres, Israel, Iran and Nuclear War: A Jurisprudential, 1 UCLA J.
INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 65 (1996); and Louis Ren6 Beres, The Iranian Threat
to Israel: Capabilities and Intentions, 9 INT'L J. INTELLIGENCE & COUNTER-
INTELLIGENCE 51 (1996). According to an article in the 19 October 1996 edition
of AL HAYAT, the Jordanian publication: "Western intelligence reports note that
Iran will succeed within one year to manufacture catastrophic nerve gas ...
Iranian activities, which President of Iran, Rafsanjani, personally oversees, are
advancing in three areas: nuclear, chemical and biological weapons." Reported by
IMRA (Independent Media Review and Analysis; 22 October 1996).
5. The accepted theory of "Launch-on-Warning" describes a strategic
doctrine calling for the launch of bombers and/or land-based missiles on receipt
of warning (from satellites or other early-detection systems) that a missile attack
is underway. This established doctrine, which requires launch before the attacking
warheads reach their intended targets, is sometimes called "launch on positive or
confirmed notification of attack" to distinguish between possible and actual attack.
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likelihood of unauthorized and/or accidental wars (including in the
future, nuclear wars)6 would be increased.
It is also clear that merely acknowledging what one's adversa-
ries have already believed need not necessarily enhance Israeli
deterrence. Even if Israel should move from its position of
ambiguity to disclosure (full or partial), enemies of the Jewish state
might not realize the nuclear threat and thus commence aggres-
sion.7 Or, perhaps even more ominously for Israel, disclosure
In a crisis situation, it could be seriously destabilizing.
6. See generally, LouIs RENI BERES, APOCALYPSE: NUCLEAR CATAS-
TROPHE IN WORLD POLITICS (1980); Louis RENI BERES, MIMICKING SISYPHUS:
AMERICA'S COUNTERVAILING NUCLEAR STRATEGY (1983); Louis RENt BERES,
REASON AND REALPOLITIK: U.S. FOREIGN POLICY AND WORLD ORDER (1984);
and LOUIS RENA BERES, SECURITY OR ARMAGEDDON: ISRAEL'S NUCLEAR
STRATEGY (1986) (explaining expected consequences of nuclear war).
7. See Resolution on the Definition of Aggression. G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX),
U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp. No. 31, at 142, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1975), reprinted
in 13 I.L.M. 710 (1974). For pertinent codifications of the criminalization of
aggression, see also The 1928 Kellogg-Briand Pact (Pact of Paris), Treaty Providing
for the Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National Policy, Aug. 27, 1928,
46 Stat. 2343, 94 L.N.T.S. 57; U.N. Charter art. 2, 4; Declaration on the
Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States and the Protection
of Their Independence and Sovereignty, G.A. Res. 2131, U.N. GAOR, 20th Sess.,
Supp. No. 14, at 11, U.N. doc. A/6014 (1965), reprinted in 5 I.L.M. 374 (1966);
Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and
Co-operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United
Nations, G.A. Res. 2625, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, at 121. U.N.
Doc. A/8028 (1970); Declaration on the Non-use of Force in International
Relations and Permanent Prohibition on the Use of Nuclear Weapons, G.A. Res.
2936, U.N. GAOR, 27th Sess., Supp. No. 30 at 5, U.N. Doc. A/8730 (1972);
Charter of the International Military Tribunal, annex to the Agreement for the
Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis,
Aug. 8, 1945, art. 6, 59 Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 279; Resolution Affirming the
Principles of International Law Recognized by the Charter of the Nuremberg
Tribunal, G.A. Res. 95(1), U.N. Doc. A/236 at 1144 (1946). See also Convention
on the Rights and Duties of States, Dec. 26, 1933, arts. 8, 10-11, 49 Stat. 3097, 165
L.N.T.S. 19 (known generally as the "Montevideo Convention"); Pact of the
League of Arab States, Mar. 22, 1945, art. 5, 70 U.N.T.S. 237; Charter of the
Organization of American States, Apr. 30, 1948, chs. II, IV, V, 2 U.S.T. 2394,
T.I.A.S. No. 2361, 119 U.N.T.S. 3 and Protocol of Amendment, Feb. 27, 1967, 21
U.S.T. 607, T.I.A.S. No. 6847 (known generally as the "Protocol of Buenos
Aires"); Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, Sept. 2, 1947, 62 Stat.
1681., 121 U.N.T.S. 77 (known generally as the "Rio Pact"); American Treaty on
Pacific Settlement, Apr. 30, 1948, 30 U.N.T.S. 55 (known generally as the "Pact
of Bogota"); Charter of the Organization of African Unity, May 25, 1963, arts. II,
III, 479 U.N.T.S. 39. For more on aggression, see Draft Code of Crimes Against
the Peace and Security of Mankind, adopted by the U.N. International Law
Commission in 1954, 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm. 150 (1954), revised in 1987, 1988 and
1989. U.N. Doc. A/42/420 (1987), U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/404 (1987), U.N. Doc.
A/43/539 (1988), U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/419 (1989), and U.N. Doc. A/44/150 (1989).
See also Declaration on the Right of Peoples to Peace. G.A. Res. 39/11/ Annex,
1997]
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could prod enemy leaders to preempt in the near future, a decision
that would flow from their presumption that (1) war with Israel is
inevitable;8 and (2) Israel's vulnerability will only diminish.
The creation of Palestine from the territories could also affect
Israel's inclination to preempt.9 One argument suggests that
because of Israel's diminished size, its inclination to strike first at
enemy hard targets would be especially high."° After all, now
deprived of strategic depth," it could not hold out for as long as
U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess., Supp. No. 51 at 22, U.N. Doc. A/391L.14 (1984).
8. The agreements that concluded the first Arab-Israeli War (1947-1949) were
general armistice agreements negotiated bilaterally between Israel and Egypt on
Feb. 24, 1949 (42 U.N.T.S. 251-70, 1949); Israel and Lebanon on Mar. 23, 1949 (42
U.N.T.S. 287-98, 1949); Israel and Jordan on Apr. 3, 1949 (42 U.N.T.S. 303-20,
1949); and between Israel and Syria on July 20, 1949 (U.N.T.S..327-40, 1949).
Pursuant to these agreements, the Security Council, on Aug. 11, 1949, issued a
Resolution which, inter alia, "notes with satisfaction the several Armistice
Agreements," and "F[inds] that the Armistice Agreements constitute an important
step toward the establishment of permanent peace in Palestine and considers that
these agreements supersede the truce provided for in the resolutions of the
Security Council of 28 May and 15 July 1948." See Security Council Resolution
Noting The Armistice Agreements and Reaffirming The Order To Observe An
Unconditional Cease Fire Pending A Final Peace Settlement, Aug. 11, 1949, S.C.
Res. 73, U.N. SCOR, 20th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/1376, II, (1949).
9. The PLO, of course, has already declared itself a state. See Palestine
National Council, Declaration of Independence, Nov. 15, 1988; in Walter Laqueur
and Barry Rubin eds., THE ISRAEL-ARAB READER 542-46 (New York: Penguin
Books, 1955). But such declaration does not satisfy the generally-accepted criteria
for statehood identified under international law: control over a fixed and clearly
defined territory; a population; a government; and the capacity to engage in
diplomatic and foreign relations. See Convention on Rights and Duties of States,
Dec. 26, 1933, art. 1, 49 Stat. 3097, 165 L.N.T.S. 19.
10. Let us recall, here, Pufendorf's argument:
... where it is quite clear that the other is already planning an
attack upon me, even though he has not yet fully revealed his
intentions, it will be permitted at once to begin forcible self-
defense, and to anticipate him who is preparing mischief,
provided there be no hope that, when admonished in a friendly
spirit, he may put off his hostile temper; or if such admonition
be likely to injure our cause. Hence, he is to be regarded as the
aggressor, who first conceived the wish to injure, and prepared
himself to carry it out. But the excuse of self-defense will be
his, who by quickness shall overpower his slower assailant. And
for defense, it is not required that one receive the first blow, or
merely avoid and parry those aimed at him.
SAMUEL PUFENDORF, ON THE DUTY OF MAN AND CITIZEN ACCORDING TO
NATURAL LAW 32 (Frank Gardner Moore trans. 1964).
11. Efraim Inbar points out that according to Israel's new strategic thinking,
strategic depth-an article of faith in the past-is now a "strategic anachronism."
See Efraim Inbar, Contours of Israel's New Strategic Thinking, 111 POL. SCI. Q.
41, 50-51 (1996). This change of thinking, says Inbar, is part of a growing overall
depreciation of military power and a growing overall reluctance to use military
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was possible when Palestine was still the territories. In this
connection, it is possible that a shift from deliberate ambiguity to
disclosure after Palestine came into existence would reduce the
Israeli incentive to preempt, but only if Jerusalem were made to
believe that its nuclear threat, as a result of this shift, was being
taken more seriously by the Arabs and/or Iran.
We are so often told, however, that this is the "era of
missiles."12 In such an era, strategic depth is allegedly no longer
vital. Hence, Israel could dispose of the territories with impunity,
at least as far as security matters are concerned.
Such reasoning, however, ignores a chief menace to Israel,
which is that enemy ground forces often attack and occupy. Even
if missiles13 fired from considerable distances could produce great
harm to Israeli cities and populations, they could not make possible
an Arab or Iranian takeover of certain Jewish State areas without
a prior cession of Judea/Samaria (West Bank)/Gaza and/or the
force. Id. at 42.
12. In early October 1991, Israel announced its agreement to formally join the
Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) by the end of the year. See Gerald
Steinberg, Middle EastArms Control and Disarmament, BESA Security and Policy
Studies, No. 10, BESA Center for Strategic Studies, June 1993; and Efraim Inbar,
Contours of Israel's New Strategic Thinking, BESA Security and Policy Studies,
No. 27, BESA Center for Strategic Studies, June 1996, pp. 60-61. Conceived in
April 1987, MTCR seeks to control the transfer of highly-sensitive missile
technology from industrialized states to the Third World.. Id. By focusing on
missiles carrying 500 kg payloads or more at ranges beyond 300 km, it is especially
aimed at control of nuclear missiles. Id.
13. The major surface-to-surface (SSM) missile threat to Israel is from missiles
equipped with chemical or nuclear warheads. See Louis Ren6 Beres, SECURITY
THREATS AND EFFECTIVE REMEDIES: ISRAEL'S STRATEGIC, TACTICAL, AND
LEGAL OPTIONS: A Comprehensive Master Plan Prepared Especially for Prime
Minister Netanyahu, Houston, TX: Freeman Center for Strategic Studies 46 (1996).
See also Yoash Tsiddon-Chatto, Israel Must Prepare for the Missile Threat,
JERUSALEM POST, Jan. 5, 1997, reprinted in THE MACCABEAN, Feb. 1997 at 13-14.
It is the author's opinion that until it becomes possible to reliably intercept SSMs
in flight, the Jewish State will have to focus on destroying them while they are still
on the ground. Should this preemption option be undertaken in the near term, it
could not be complemented by effective anti-tactical ballistic missile (ATBM)
defenses. If, however, it should be undertaken more than five or six years from
now (essentially by the start of the next millennium), it could be reinforced by
"Arrow" missiles that are integrated into a multi-stage system for in-flight
interception. Nevertheless, recalling the extraordinary destructiveness of even a
single nuclear missile that would defy interception, it is unlikely that an Israeli
deferral of preemption would be cost-effective. Unless the Arrow were judged
nearly 100% effective (an inconceivable judgment) and unless Israel's enemies
judged certain not to attack until Jerusalem's ATBM deployment were complete
(an impossible determination), near-term preemption (for all of its political and
military costs) would appear to be more rational.
1997]
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Golan Heights. 4 The ultimate danger to Israel is thus physical
conquest of Israeli territory by enemy ground forces,is and this
danger would be heightened enormously by the creation of
Palestine and/or transfer of the Golan.
Several other problems must be considered. First, how would
Israel's leadership actually know that taking the bomb out of the
basement had improved its deterrence posture? To a certain
extent, the credibility of Jerusalem's nuclear threats would be
contingent upon the severity of different provocations. For
example, Israel might be believable if it were to threaten nuclear
reprisals for provocations that endanger the very survival of the
Jewish state, 6 but it would almost certainly be unbelievable if the
14. This point was made as early as June 29, 1967, when a U.S. Joint Chiefs
of Staff Memorandum specified that returning Israel to pre-1967 boundaries would
drastically increase its vulnerability to actual takeover. In October, 1988, one
hundred retired U.S. generals and admirals, seven of four-star rank, issued a
statement urging Israel not to withdraw from Judea and Samaria. The statement
read, in part:
The Samarian and Judean high ridges cannot be effectively
demilitarized or adequately inspected. If Israel loses its
extensive early warning line, it would have virtually no warning
of attack. Now the Arab armies are at least four times their
size in 1967. Even with missiles and supersonic aircraft causing
great devastation, they cannot occupy. Only infantry and armor
can overrun a country and those are vulnerable to natural
borders. To remain strong, Israel must retain the Jordan River
as its eastern border. Pressing Israel to withdraw from this line
will bring neither peace nor serve America's interests.
See Gail Winston, Israel's Chief of Staff Cites U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff on Israel's
Defensible Borders, THE CAUCUS CURRENT, Sept. 1993, at 24-25. See also HIRSH
GOODMAN & W. SETH CARUS, THE FUTURE BATTLEFIELD AND THE ARAB
ISRAELI CONFLICT (1990); Yohanan Ramati and Shlomo Baum, Can Israel Survive
the Loss of Judea and Samaria, MIDSTREAM, Aug.-Sept. 1992, at 19-21; Edward
Saar, The West Bank and Modern Arms, 1 NATIV. 3 (1990).
15. This danger must still include Iraq. Saddam Hussein's country has been
an active enemy of Israel since the Jewish State's initial drive for independence.
Baghdad sent substantial expeditionary forces against Israel in the 1948 War of
Independence, the Six Day War (1967), and the Yom Kippur War (1973). During
the 1948 War, Iraqi forces entered Transjordan and engaged Israeli forces in
Western Samaria. In the aftermath of the 1967 War, Iraqi forces, which were
again deployed in Jordan, remained there for more than two years. During the
1973 War, Baghdad committed about one-third of its then 95,000 man armed-
forces to assist Syria in its campaign against the IDF on the Golan. See Yonathan
L., Iraq: Regional Ambitions and Traditional Fears, IDF J., Summer 1989, at 56-62.
16. Such provocations could amount to authentic instances of genocide. War
and genocide need not only be mutually exclusive. Rather, war might well be the
means whereby genocide is undertaken. According to Articles II and III of the
Genocide Convention, which entered into force on January 12, 1951, genocide
includes any of several acts "committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part,
a national, ethnical, racial or religious group as such .. " Convention on the
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threats are based on relatively minor territorial infringements or
incursions.1
7
In view of what is now generally believed about Israel
throughout the Middle East and beyond, there is every reason to
assume that Israel's nuclear arsenal does exist, and that Israel's
enemies share this assumption. 8 The most critical question about
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Jan. 12, 1951, 78 U.N.T.S.
277, 280. Therefore, it follows that where Israel is recognized as the institutiona-
lized expression of the Jewish People (an expression that includes national,
ethnical, racial and religious components), acts of war intended to destroy the
Jewish State could assuredly be genocidal. Regarding such intentions, the Israeli
people have already seen much of the Islamic world, Iran and Syria in particular,
seek Israel's forcible destruction. In the words of Islamic Jihad, the Iranian-
backed terrorist group claiming responsibility for the March 1992 bombing of the
Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires: "The war is open until Israel ceases to exist and
until the last JEW ... . Israel is all evil and should be WIPED OUT OF EXISTENCE
in the world is eliminated. .. ." (emphasis added). Nadim Ladki, Islamic Jihad
Vows More Attacks on Israel, REUTERS, Mar. 23, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis
Library, CURRENT File.
17. In the aftermath of the recent Gulf War, Israel-intrawar threats
notwithstanding--decided not to respond with any reprisals to Iraq's 39 missile
attacks against the Jewish State. In the author's opinion, if Israel had decided to
respond, against Baghdad's military assets, this response could have been
characterized by Jerusalem as any one of the following: (1) reprisal; (2) self-
defense; or (3) anticipatory self-defense. Alternatively, Israel could have argued
persuasively that: (4) a condition of war has existed between the Jewish State and
Iraq since 1948 at Iraq's insistence, and that Israel's latest military strikes were not
measures of self-help short of war (i.e., not instances of reprisal, self-defense, or
anticipatory self-defense), but rather just one more legitimate use of force in an
ongoing conflict. In the final analysis, the lawfulness of Israel's counterstrike and
the reasonableness of its characterization would have depended upon such facts
as general moves toward peace underway in the region, amount of elapsed time
between Iraq's aggression and Israel's response and level of continuing danger to
Israel from the Baghdad regime. Significantly, if Jerusalem should have opted for
number (4) (above), unless a formal peace settlement were already being
negotiated between Israel and Iraq (highly improbable), its military counterstrike
would have been prima facie lawful so long as it fulfilled the settled peremptory
criteria of the laws of war-namely, the expectations of discrimination, propor-
tionality and military necessity.
18. Shortly before leaving office, former Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres
remarked that Israel would be willing "to give up the atom" if other states in the
region were to achieve "full peace." This stated willingness followed by Peres'
earlier remark that Israel would be prepared to join the NPT (Nonproliferation
Treaty) two years after the conclusion of a comprehensive peace with all Arab
states and Iran. See AVI BEKER, ISRAEL'S LONG CORRIDOR: AMBIGUITY AND
NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION, INST. OF THE WORLD JEWISH CONGRESS 7
(1995). See also JERUSALEM POST, Aug. 31, 1994 and HA'ARETZ, Mar. 24, 1995.
For a very recent statement of Israel's position on the establishment of a Nuclear
Weapons Free Zone in the Middle East, see Yehiel Yativ, Statement to the United
Nations General Assembly, Fifty-first Session, First Committee, Oct. 18, 1996
(copies available from Israel's Permanent Mission to the United Nations, New
1997]
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Israel's nuclear deterrent, therefore, is not one of capability, but
one of willingness. How likely is it that Israel, after launching non-
nuclear preemptive strikes against enemy hard targets, would
respond to enemy reprisals with nuclear counterretaliation?
To answer this question, Israel's decision-makers will have to
put themselves into the shoes of various enemy leaders. Will these
leaders calculate that they can afford to retaliate against Israel, i.e.,
that such retaliation would not produce nuclear counterretaliation?
In asking this question, they will assume, of course, a non-nuclear
retaliation against Israel. A nuclear retaliation, should it become
technically possible, would assuredly invite a nuclear counterretalia-
tory blow.1 9
What will they conclude? This depends, in turn, upon their
view of enemy reciprocal judgments about Israel's pertinent
leaders. Do these judgments suggest a leadership that believes it
can gain the upper-hand with nuclear counterretaliation? Or do
they suggest a leadership that believes such counterretaliation
would bring upon Israel intolerable levels of harm and destruction?
Depending upon the way in which' the enemy decision-makers
interpret Israel's authoritative perceptions, they will accept or reject
the cost-effectiveness of a non-nuclear retaliation against Israel.
This means that it is in Israel's interest to communicate the
following strategic assumption to its enemies: Israel would be
acting rationally by responding to enemy non-nuclear reprisals to
Israeli preemptive attacks with nuclear counterretaliation. ° The
plausibility of this assumption would be enhanced considerably if
York City). This statement by the distinguished Israeli diplomat acknowledges the
prospect of a denuclearized Israel, but only as part of a "durable peace" in the
region, a condition where no other state in the area would have nuclear weapons.
These remarks represented an unprecedented departure from Israel's longstanding
policy of "deliberate ambiguity" on nuclear weapons. See id.
19. There is, of course, no way to authoritatively substantiate this assertion.
Israel's policy on such matters remains a very deep secret. Nevertheless, we can
extrapolate from Israeli "hints" from time to time (e.g., to Iraq during the Gulf
War) that any use of nuclear weapons against Israel would elicit a response in
kind. Further, common sense dictates that Israeli survival would be contingent
upon such nuclear responses. For more by this author on the probable nuances
of Israeli nuclear policy, see, e.g., Louis Rend Beres, Israel's Bomb in the
Basement. A Second Look, 2 ISRAEL AFF. 112 (Autumn 1995).
20. The author's basis for this proposition is the need to enhance deterrence
credibility. Without such communication by Israel, enemies of the Jewish State
could conclude that they would be able to dominate escalation processes, i.e., to
achieve what military strategists call "escalation dominance." Such a conclusion
would undermine Israeli deterrence and endanger national survival.
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enemy reprisals were to involve chemical and/or biological weapons.
All of these calculations, of course, assume rationality.2 In
the absence of calculations that compare the costs and benefits of
strategic alternatives, the result of what will happen in the Middle
East is only a matter of conjecture. Significantly, the prospect of
non-rational judgments in the region is increasingly likely, especial-
ly as the influence of Islamic fundamentalism22 spreads to Arab
leadership elites. 3 To the extent that Israel might one day believe
itself confronted with nonrational enemies, particularly ones with
highly destructive weapons in their arsenals, its incentive to
preempt would become overwhelming. In fact, if Israel believes
such enemies hold nuclear weapons, Israel might even decide to
21. Even if one were to assume that Arab leadership behavior will always be
rational, this would say nothing about the accuracy of information used in rational
calculations. Rationality refers only to the intention of maximizing specified
values or preferences. It does not tell us anything about whether the information
used is correct or incorrect. Hence, rational state actors may make errors in
calculation that lead them to war.
22. In Islam, the Prophet is said to have predicted a final battle to annihilate
the Jews. See D.F. Green, ed., Arab Theologians on Jews and Israel: Extracts
from the Proceedings of the Fourth Conference of the Academy of Islamic
Research 49-50 (1976), cited in ROBERT S. WISTRICH, ANTISEMITISM: THE
LONGEST HATRED 230 (1991). Mohammed, it is reported, had stated: "The Hour
(i.e., salvation) would not come until you fight against the Jews; and the stone
would say, '0 Muslim! There is a Jew behind me: come and kill him."' Id. at 230.
23. In considering these elites, one must not fail to include Saudi Arabia.
Although long regarded by Washington as a "moderate Arab" state that has no
strong and active opposition to Israel, Saudi Arabia preceded every other Muslim
and Arab state in its open expression of virulent antisemitism. See WISTRICH,
supra note 22, at 232. Even before World War II, King Abd al Aziz ibn Sa'ud
deplored "the strange hypnotic influence which the Jews, a race accursed by God
according to His Holy Book, and destined to final destruction and eternal
damnation," appeared to exercise over his people. See Foreign Office File
371/20822 E7201/22/31. The text is reproduced and elucidated in ELIE KEDOURIE,
ISLAM AND THE MODERN WORLD AND OTHER STUDIES 71 (1980). See also
WISTRICH, supra note 22, at 232. Curiously, Ibn Sa'ud's strong hatred of the Jews
paralleled the Christian core of antisemitism: "Our hatred for the Jews dates from
God's condemnation of them for their persecution and rejection of Isa (Jesus
Christ), and their subsequent rejection later of His chosen Prophet." Id. On
another occasion, King Sa'ud informed a British visitor to his court: "Verily, the
word of God teaches us, and we implicitly believe it, that for a Muslim to kill a
Jew, or for him to be killed by a Jew, ensures him an immediate entry into
Heaven and into the august presence of God Almighty." Id. at 233. King Feisal,
in the tradition of his father, was known for distributing copies of THE PROTO-
COLS OF THE ELDERS OF ZION (for which the Arab world is the largest
global market today) to all visiting dignitaries. Id. This has included U.S.
Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, who is Jewish. Id. At the moment, Saudi
Arabia finances anti-Semitic Holocaust denial literature, much of it written by
American neo-Nazis. Id.
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launch a nuclear preemption against these weapons. This would
appear to be the only circumstance in which an Israeli nuclear
preemptive strike could be rational.
In this connection, it is conceivable, perhaps even likely, that
an Israeli non-nuclear preemption would be the best way to reduce
the risk of regional nuclear war.24 (This follows from the assump-
tion that if Israel waits for its enemies to strike first, these enemies
may launch nuclear attacks, or-even if they strike first with
conventional weapons-Israel will have no choice but to resort to
nuclear retaliation.) 25  To the extent that this is indeed the case,
the reasonableness/legality of Israeli non-nuclear preemption would
be enhanced. 26  Here, Jerusalem's commitment to anticipatory
self-defense 27 would be distinctly law-enforcing. No such defense,
of course, could be mustered on behalf of an Israeli nuclear
preemption, which would, in all circumstances, be in violation of
24. See infra text accompanying notes 25-30. As explained in the following
text, this assertion rests upon the presumption that Israeli rejection of the non-
nuclear preemption option would more likely lead to nuclear exchanges.
25. It is the author's opinion that, although it cannot be ruled out that an
Israeli non-nuclear preemption might still lead to nuclear exchanges (this would
depend, in part, on the effectiveness and breadth of Israeli targeting, the surviving
number of enemy nuclear weapons and the willingness of enemy leaders to risk
Israeli nuclear counter-retaliation), such exchanges appear more likely if Syria
and/or Iran are allowed to deploy ever-greater numbers of unconventional
weapons without interference. Indeed, should such deployment ever take place,
Israel's incentive to nuclear preemptions could become overwhelming.
26. This assumes, of course, that Israel will have exhausted all forms of
peaceful remedy. A similar imperative can be found in Jewish religious law.
"When thou comest near to a city to fight against it," proclaims Deuteronomy
20:10, "then proclaim peace to it." This thinking related back to Biblical times
and commentator, Abrabanel (1437-1508) who argued not to hurry to go to war.
For more complete examinations of war in the Jewish tradition, see Efraim Inbar,
War in Jewish Tradition, 9 JERUSALEM J. INT'L REL. 83 (1987).
27. For more by this author on anticipatory self defense under international
law, with particular reference to Israel, see generally Louis Rend Beres, Preserving
the Third Temple: Israel's Right of Anticipatory Self-Defense Under International
Law, 26 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 111 (1993); Louis Rend Beres, After the Gulf
War: Israel, Preemption and Anticipatory Self Defense, 13 HOuS. J. INT'L L. 259
(1991); Louis Rend Beres, Striking 'First': Israel's Post-Gulf War Options Under
International Law, 14 LOY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 1 (1991); Louis Rend Beres,
Israel and Anticipatory Self Defense, 8 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 89 (1991); Louis
Rend Beres, After the Scud Attacks: Israel, 'Palestine, and Anticipatory Self
Defense, 6 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 71 (1992). For an examination of assassination
as a permissible form of anticipatory self-defense by Israel, see generally Louis
Rend Beres, On Assassination as Anticipatory Self-Defense: The Case of Israel, 20
HOFSTRA L. REV. 321 (1991).
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international law.2 Moreover, if Israel feels compelled to actually
resort to nuclear war-fighting at some point, either after (1) Arab
reprisals for Israel's conventional preemption cause the Jewish
State to escalate to nuclear weapons; or (2) Arab chemi-
cal/biological/conventional first-strikes cause Israel to escalate to
nuclear weapons, it would confront substantial problems under
international law.29 Should certain enemy states launch nuclear
first-strikes against Israel, Jerusalem's retaliatory use of nuclear
weapons would be far less problematic jurisprudentially, but
matters of law in such circumstances would assuredly be moot.30
28. It is widely known that the laws of war, the rules of jus in bello, comprise:
(1) laws on weapons; (2) laws on warfare; and (3) humanitarian rules. Codified
primarily at the Hague and Geneva Conventions, and known throughout the
international community as the law of the Hague and the law of Geneva, these
rules attempt to bring discrimination, proportionality, and military necessity into
belligerent calculations. See Convention No. IV Respecting the Laws and Customs
of War on Land, With Annex of Regulations, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, T.S. No.
539, (known commonly as the "Hague Regulations"); Convention for the
Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the
Field, Oct. 21, 1950, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Convention for the Ameliora-
tion of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed
Forces at Sea, Oct. 21, 1950, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Convention Relative
to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Oct. 21, 1950, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S.
135; Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War,
Oct. 21, 1950, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.
29. This is the case because nuclear weapons are apt to violate, by definition,
the jus in bello expectations of discrimination, proportionality, and military
necessity. See NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND LAW (Arthur S. Miller & Martin
Feinrider eds., 1984). See generally LouIs RENt BERES, APOCALYPSE: NUCLEAR
CATASTROPHE IN WORLD POLITICS (1980); Louis RENA BERES, PEOPLE, STATES
AND WORLD ORDER (1981); Louis RENl BERES, MIMICKING SISYPHUS:
AMERICA'S COUNTERVAILING NUCLEAR STRATEGY (1983); Louis RENt BERES,
REASON AND REALPOLITIK: US FOREIGN POLICY AND WORLD ORDER (1984);
LOUIS RENt BERES, AMERICA OUTSIDE THE WORLD: THE COLLAPSE OF US
FOREIGN POLICY (1987).
30. For assessments of nuclear weapons under international law, see generally
The Illegality of Nuclear Weapons: Statement of the Lawyer's Committee on
Nuclear Policy, 8 ALTERNATIVES: J. WORLD POL'Y, 291 (1982); RICHARD FALK
ET AL., NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (1981); John H.E. Fried,
First Use of Nuclear Weapons - Existing Prohibitions in International Law, BULL.
OF PEACE PROPOSALS, Jan. 1981, at 21-29; Matthew Lippman, Nuclear Weapons
and International Law: Towards A Declaration on the Prevention and Punishment
of the Crime of Nuclear Humancide, 8 LOY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 183 (1986);
Ian Brownlie, Some Legal Aspects of the Use of Nuclear Weapons, 14 INT'L &
COMP. L.Q. 437 (1965); Francis A. Boyle, The Relevance of International Law to
the 'Paradox' of Nuclear Deterrence, 80 Nw. U. L. REV. 1407 (1986); James A.
Stegenga, Nuclearism and International Law, 4 PUB. AFF. Q. 69-80 (1990);
GEOFFREY BEST, HUMANITY IN WARFARE (1980); JAMES TURNER JOHNSON,
JUST WAR TRADITION AND THE RESTRAINT OF WAR (1981); NUCLEAR
WEAPONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (Istvan Pogany ed., 1987); Daniel J. Arbess,
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This Article will discuss the likelihood of regional nuclear war
by discussing possible decision-making processes of Israel and
Israel's neighbors. Part II discusses Israel's choices with regard to
levels and types of nuclear actions. Part III discusses, in detail,
nuclear warfighting, as a result of an apparent need for some type
or level of nuclear intervention. Next, Part IV discusses some
international legal theories as well as the history of Palestine,
including who has had control over the land over the centuries.
Part V then discusses the concept of Israel as a "system" and the
effects of the Peace Process and territorial loss on the "system."
Finally, Part VI concludes that the Middle East Peace Process is
leading toward war and that the Peace Process has placed Israel in
an unwinnable situation.
II. Israel's Choices
Israel's enemies and friends must understand that there are
conditions wherein Jerusalem actually might decide to use its
nuclear weapons.31 Faced with what would be perceived as
imminent destruction of the Third Temple, Israel's leaders would
likely do whatever is needed to endure, including a resort to
nuclear retaliation, nuclear counterretaliation, nuclear preemption,
and nuclear warfighting.
A. Nuclear Retaliation
Should an enemy launch a nuclear first-strike against Israel,
Jerusalem would certainly respond, to the extent possible, with a
The International Law of Armed Conflict in Light of Contemporary Deterrence
Strategies: Empty Promise or Meaningful Restraint? 30 MCGILL L.J. 89 (1984);
Elbert D. Thomas, Atomic Bombs in International Society, 39 AMER. J. INT'L L.
736-44 (1945); E.C. Stowell, Laws of War and the Atomic Bomb, 39 AMER. J.
INT'L L. 784-88 (1945); John N. Moore, Nuclear Weapons and the Law: Enhancing
Strategic Stability, 9 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 263 (1983); Eugene V. Rostow, The
Great Nuclear Debate, 8 YALE J. WORLD PUB. ORD. 87-102 (1981).
31. On Israel's nuclear weapons posture, see generally SHLOMO ARONSON,
THE POLITICS AND STRATEGY OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THE MIDDLE EAST:
OPACITY, THEORY AND REALITY, 1960-1991 (1992); FRANK BARNABY, THE
INVISIBLE BOMB: THE NUCLEAR ARMS RACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST (1989);
MCGEORGE BUNDY, DANGER AND SURVIVAL (1988); YAIR EVRON, ISRAEL'S
NUCLEAR DILEMMA (1987); PIERRE PEAN, LES DEUX BOMBES (1982); TAYSIR
NASHIF, NUCLEAR WARFARE IN THE MIDDLE EAST: DIMENSIONS AND
RESPONSIBILITIES (1984); SEYMOUR M. HERSCH, THE SAMSON OPTION (1991);
LEONARD S. SPECTOR, THE UNDECLARED BOMB (1988); SECURITY OR
ARMAGEDDON: ISRAEL'S NUCLEAR STRATEGY (Louis Rend Beres ed., 1986).
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nuclear retaliatory strike.32 If enemy first-strikes were to involve
other forms of unconventional weapons such as chemical and/or
biological- weapons, it is conceivable that Israel might launch a
nuclear reprisal (depending, in large measure, upon Jerusalem's
expectations of follow-on aggression and on its associated calcula-
tions of comparative damage-limitation). If Israel absorbed a
massive conventional attack, a nuclear retaliation could not be
ruled out, especially if: (a) the aggressor were perceived to hold
nuclear and/or other unconventional weapons in reserve; and/or (b)
Israel's leaders were to believe that non-nuclear retaliations could
not prevent destruction of the Third Temple.33 A nuclear retalia-
tion by Israel could be ruled out only in circumstances where
enemy aggression were clearly conventional, "typical," (i.e.,
consistent with previous instances of Arab attacks in degree and
intent) and hard-target directed.34
B. Nuclear Counterretaliation
Should Israel feel compelled to preempt enemy aggression with
conventional weapons, the target State's response would largely
determine Jerusalem's next moves. If this response were in any
way nuclear, Israel would assuredly resort to nuclear counterretalia-
tion.35 If this retaliation were to involve chemical and/or biologi-
cal weapons, Israel might also feel pressed to take the escalatory
initiative (again, depending upon Jerusalem's judgments of enemy
intent and its calculations of essential damage-limitation). If the
enemy response to Israel's preemption is limited to hard-target
conventional strikes, it is unlikely that the Jewish State would
proceed with nuclear counterretaliations 6 If, however, the enemy
conventional retaliation were all-out and directed toward civilian
populations as well as to military targets, an Israeli nuclear
counterretaliation could not be ruled out.37 It would appear that
32. It is simply inconceivable that Israel would act contrary to the talionic
principle in such an instance. In the Torah, the talionic principle is espoused in
three separate passages that advance an "an eye for an eye, tooth for a tooth,"
calculus of justice. See AARON M. SCHREIBER, JEWISH LAW AND DECISION-
MAKING: A STUDY THROUGH TIME (1979).
33. The Third Temple is used to refer to the current State of Israel.
34. It is impossible to authoritatively assess this argument in an empirical
sense, but it represents an informed extrapolation "by the author" from what is
known about Israeli military doctrine and from careful deductive reasoning.
35. See generally SCHREIBER, supra note 32.
36. Id.
37. Id.
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such a counterretaliation could be ruled out only if the enemy
conventional retaliation were entirely proportionate to Israel's
preemption, confined exclusively to Israeli hard-targets, circum-
scribed by the jurisprudential limits of military necessity, and
accompanied by explicit assurances of non-escalatory intent.
C. Nuclear Preemption
It is extremely unlikely that Israel would ever decide to launch
a preemptive nuclear strike. Although circumstances might arise
wherein such a strike would be perfectly rational (i.e., the prospec-
tive benefits of the strike would outweigh the prospective costs), it
is implausible that Israel would allow itself to reach these circum-
stances.38 Moreover, unless the nuclear weapons involved were
used in a fashion consistent with the authoritative expectations of
the laws of war-the limits of discrimination, proportionality, and
military necessity-this form of preemption would clearly represent
an egregious violation of international law.39 And even if such
consistency were possible, the psychological/political impact on the
world community would be negative and far-reaching.' It follows
that an Israeli nuclear preemption could be expected only: (a)
where Israel's enemies4' had acquired nuclear and/or other
38. This assertion is based upon the author's belief that Israeli decision-makers
are thoughtful and rational.
39. Here, again, we refer to the issue of "just means" or jus in bello. See
supra note 28, the "Hague Regulations." The origins of such criteria are much
older than the nuclear age. At book 3, Chapter 11, of Hugo Grotius' THE LAW
OF WAR AND PEACE, the writer speaks of the need to allow innocents an
opportunity to escape from carnage, an imperative that is itself drawn from the
Hebrew Bible. According to Grotius: "The Jewish interpreters note that it was a
custom among their ancestors that, when they were besieging a city, they would
not completely encircle it, but would leave a sector open for those who wished to
escape, in order that the issue might be determined with less bloodshed." A
similar argument was made by Polybius (PUNIC WARS) in his account of Scipio
Aemilianus' proclamation upon the destruction of Carthage: "Let those who wish,
flee;" and by the judgement of Tacitus, "To butcher those who have surrendered
is savage." See Louis RENt BERES, AMERICA OUTSIDE THE WORLD: THE
COLLAPSE OF US FOREIGN POLICY, supra note 29, at 90.
40. This assertion is based upon the author's understanding that world public
opinion would be enormously hostile to such a use of nuclear weapons.
41. This term refers to any Arab state (including Egypt and Jordan, with which
Israel has made formal peace arrangements) and to Iran. Although it is generally
fashionable to conclude that formal peace treaties end belligerencies, such a
conclusion displays the fallacy of legalism. In fact, relations between Israel and
Egypt remain cold and strained, in spite of the formal peace condition. On this
"cold" peace, see, e.g., Yohanan Ramati, Israel's Most Dangerous Enemy, 6 BULL.
JERUSALEM INST. FOR WESTERN DEF. 2-14 (June 1993); Gerald M. Steinberg,
Israe Egypt and Nuclear Policy, JERUSALEM LETTERIVIEWPOINTS, June 15, 1995,
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unconventional weapons judged capable of destroying the Third
Temple; (b) where these enemies had made clear that their
intentions paralleled their capabilities; (c) where these enemies
were believed ready to begin a "countdown to launch;" and (d)
where Jerusalem believed that Israeli non-nuclear preemptions
could not achieve needed minimum levels of damage-limitation
(i.e., levels consistent with preservation of the Third Temple).42
III. Nuclear Warfighting
If nuclear weapons are introduced into conflict between Israel
and its enemies, nuclear warfighting, at one level or another, would
ensue. This would hold true as long as: (a) enemy first-strikes
against Israel would not destroy Jerusalem's second-strike nuclear
capability; (b) enemy retaliations for Israeli conventional preemp-
tion would not destroy Jerusalem's nuclear counterretaliatory
capability; (c) Israeli preemptive strikes involving nuclear weapons
would not destroy enemy second-strike nuclear capabilities; and (d)
Israeli retaliation for enemy conventional first-strikes would not
destroy enemy nuclear counterretaliatory capability.43 It follows,
from Israel's strategic requirements, that Jerusalem should now
ensure the likelihood of (a) and (b) above, and the unlikelihood of
(c) and (d). This means, among other things, strengthening the
hard-target kill capacity of its survivable nuclear forces.
To function successfully, Israel's deterrent, even after being
removed from the "basement," would have to be secure from
enemy preemptive strikes. Moreover, Israel must also be wary of
"decapitation," of losing the "head" of its military command and
control system because of enemy first strikes.' If Israel's enemies
at 1; Louis Rend Beres, Where the Shadow Really Falls: Why Israel Must Have
Nuclear Weapons, THE BROWN JOURNAL OF WORLD AFFAIRS (prepared in
response to In the Shadow of the Israeli Nuclear Bombs: Egyptian Threat Percep-
tions, an article by Abel Monem Said Aly in the Summer/Fall 1996 issue of THE
BROWN JOURNAL, pp. 151-62). Said Aly, who contends that Israel is an aggressor
state, is Director of the AI-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies, Cairo.
42. This assertion by the author is based upon the assumption that Israel's
decision-makers are rational and that they value national survival more highly than
any other preference or combination of preferences.
43. It is the author's opinion that nuclear retaliation remains a possibiltiy so
long as any state in the region maintains nuclear weapons. This does not mean,
however, that nuclear weapons are invariably destabilizing or that such weapons
are harmful irrespective of who holds them.
44. This raises the issue of what is generally called "regime targeting." See,
e.g., David Rodman, Regime-Targeting: A Strategy for Israel, 2 ISR. AFF. 153-67
(Autumn 1995).
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are unpersuaded by Jerusalem's move away from deliberate
ambiguity they might direct such strikes that could effectively
immobilize Israel's order of battle.
A contrary argument concerning the effects of Palestine on
Israel's inclination to preempt suggests that because of Israel's
newly expanded vulnerability,45 its nuclear deterrent would be
more credible than ever before. As a result, Jerusalem could better
afford not to strike first than when it still administered the
territories. In this situation the principal benefit of shifting from
ambiguity to disclosure would seem to lie in an explicitly-identified
escalation ladder revealing a broad array of intended Israeli
reprisals, ranging from limited conventional responses to measured
nuclear strikes.
In weighing the various arguments concerning the effect of
Palestine upon Israeli preemption, particular attention must be
directed toward Israel's presumptions about the inevitability of
war" and the long-term expectations for enemy vulnerability. If
45. This vulnerability would be even greater if transformation of the territories
into Palestine were accompanied by a transfer of the Golan Heights to Syria. See
Louis Rend Beres & Zalman Shoval, On Demilitarizing a Palestinian 'Entity' and
the Golan Heights: An International Law Perspective, 28 VAND. L.J. TRANSNAT'L.
959 (1995). Should Israel relinquish the territories and the Golan, all Israeli
military airfields would be within range of modem conventional artillery and
would be covered by enemy radar. See id. Under such conditions, the Israeli Air
Force might not even be able to get off the ground. Further, even if the new state
of Palestine and the Golan were demilitarized, enemy tanks could cover the
distance from the Jordan River to the pre-1967 border in 3 to 4 hours. See id. In
the Golan, this time would be reduced to about one hour. See id.
46. The ongoing Middle East Peace Process has done nothing to challenge
these presumptions. Whatever their current military incapacities, Israel's ene-
mies-especially the Damascus and Teheran regimes-still prepare for a war of
annihilation against "the Zionist entity." See Louis Rend Beres, Attrition,
Annihilation and the End of Israel, U. DET. MERCY L. REV., (forthcoming Winter
1997). Regarding Syria, a recent report indicates that Syria together with Iran,
Iraq, and The Palestinian Authority, "are cooperating in preparation for war with
Israel." Freedom Center Broadcast, Jan. 22, 1997, http://freman.io.com. "Syrian
President Assad and Saddam Hussein of Iraq met secretly to this end in the spring
of 1996. Other secret meetings have been held between the Syrian Government
and the Palestinian Authority, including agreements that the Palestinian police and
other 'armed elements' will cause flare ups in the Israeli interior in case of an
escalation in the north." Id. Altogether unconcerned with Palestinian self-
determination, it is a matter of common knowledge that these regimes will be
satisfied only with Israel's disappearance. Ironically, by their public declarations
and by their deeds, in this author's experience, Iran and Syria are remarkably open
and honest about their objectives. In the words of Sheik Hassan Nasrallah, new
leader of the pro-Iranian Party of God: "The only way to achieve a lasting peace
in the Middle East is the return of all the Jewish occupiers to the lands from which
they originally came." Arab, Israeli Guns Silent in Lebanon; 200 Shiite Fighters
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Israel's leaders conclude that the creation of Palestine would make
another major war inevitable and that, over time, enemy vulnerabi-
lity to Israel would diminish, Jerusalem's inclination to strike first
would be increased.
In addition, prospect of some form of Israeli preemption likely
will increase in the future because rival states that acquire nuclear
weapons will be unwilling or unable to create the essential
infrastructure to safely manage these weapons. Inadequate
investment in nuclear weapons survivability, for example, could
generate dangerous incentives to preempt. With Israel's enemies
unlikely to possess a second-strike capability-the capacity to
retaliate after absorbing an Israeli attack-these states may
calculate a substantial military advantage to striking first. Recog-
nizing this calculation, Israel will confront an overwhelming
incentive to strike first itself.
Even in the best case scenario, wherein Israel would receive
credible assurances from its enemies concerning rejection of first-
strike options, Jerusalem will inevitably understand that such
assurances could become meaningless in the wake of political
upheavals, coup d'etat, etc. Faced with enemy states that are
characterized by weak and authoritarian political institutions, fragile
civil-military relations, and competing factions representing
numerous ethnic and religious groupings, Jerusalem undoubtedly
will recognize the danger posed by alienated elements within
enemy societies. Such danger is one for which Israel's only
reasonable antidote is apt to be one or the other form of preemp-
tion.
Are such presumptions about Israeli preemption reasonable?
Regarding the inevitability of war,47 current Arab/Iranian rearma-
Leave Battle Zone, BALT. SUN, Feb 2, 1992, at 3A. As for Syria, it has done little
to hide a superheated military buildup with billions of dollars supplied by Saudi
Arabia-money transferred, with the full blessings of Washington, for Syrian
"cooperation" in the anti-Iraq Gulf War coalition. Id.
47. Strictly speaking, of course, general historical knowledge about this region
reveals that Israel is already at war with Iran and with all Arab states except
Egypt and Jordan. The courts of individual countries have affirmed the principle
that an armistice does not end a war. See, e.g., Kahn et al. v. Anderson, 255 U.S.
1 (1921). Throughout history, armistices have normally envisaged a resumption
of hostilities. A general armistice is a war convention, an agreement or contract
concluded between belligerents. This author posits that such an agreement does
not result in the termination of a state of war. The 1907 Hague Convention IV
Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, stipulates, at the Annex to the
Convention, that "[a]n armistice suspends military operations by mutual agreement
between belligerent parties" (emphasis added). See Convention No. IV Respecting
the Laws and Customs of War on Land, With Annex of Regulations. Done at The
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ment efforts and associated preparations for conflict certainly
suggest little else.4" As for enemy vulnerability to Israel's military
forces, this will depend primarily on relative adaptation to the
changing technologies of war, a process that cannot be accurately
evaluated at this time. It follows that unless Israel's leadership
believes that shifting from ambiguity to disclosure would greatly
inhibit all or virtually all enemy Arab/Iranian forces (i.e., to the
extent that war would become not inevitable, but decreasingly
probable), Palestine would make Israeli preemptive attacks more
likely.
This does not mean that the creation of Palestine would make
Israeli nuclear deterrence irrelevant. Although nuclear weapons
Hague, Oct. 18, 1907, entered into force, Jan. 26, 1910. 36 Stat. 2277, U.S.T.S. 539,
1 Bevans 631, at Chapter V, Art. 36. Throughout history, armistices have
normally envisaged a resumption of hostilities. None of this should be taken to
imply that a formal condition of peace necessarily brings with it an authentic end
to hostilities or to the prospect of new hostilities. In January 1995, Amin A.
Elbwidi, former Egyptian Minister of War and Head of General Intelligence,
stated about Israel: "I expect war with a certainty because the agreements which
have been signed and are being signed today lead to war." (From an article in the
Egyptian weekly RUZ-EL-YUSUF, Jan. 23, 1995; cited by Aaron Lerner, Egyptian
Views of Israel's Nuclear Capability, IMRA NETVISION, Dec. 23, 1995. Regarding
the Treaty of Peace (1979) between Israel and Egypt, Sadat's intent to adhere to
the terms in good faith (what the author refers to as in international law, Pacta
Sunt Servandum) is very problematic. A vast portion of the Islamic world, for
whom any peace with Israel was and remains unacceptable, treated Sadat as a
traitor. For further discussion of this issue, see Louis Rend Beres, Power and
Survival: Why Israel Needs Nuclear Weapons, 26 INT'L J. GROUP TENSIONS 58,
n.75 (1996).
48. At the conclusion of the 1991 Gulf War, the Bush administration
announced plans to sell Saudi Arabia, a country of six million inhabitants, an arms
package of $24 billion - including over 500 tanks, 48 (now 72) F-15 fighter planes,
Apache helicopter gunships, more than 30 Patriot batteries, tens of thousands of
armored vehicles, multiple rocket-launchers, and command/control systems. See
Louis Rend Beres, "Israeli Security and Self-Reliance After the Cold War:
Geopolitical Imperatives, Strategic Considerations and Tactical Options," delivered
at the international scholarly conference, SECURITY REGIMES - ISRAEL AND ITS
NEIGHBORS, Bar-Ilan Center for Strategic Studies, June 3, 1991; Louis Rend
Beres, The Real Bases of Middle East Instability, XXXVIII MIDSTREAM 9-10
(June-July 1992). Rationalizing the Saudi demand for this vast arsenal by pointing
to the "growing danger from Iran," the Bush administration ignored that such
American arms can be used for aggression against Israel. Id. Indeed, while a
Saudi Arabia that joined in the coalition to defeat Saddam now appears benign,
this monarchy has been busily compensating the Assad regime in Syria with
billions of dollars in aid-money to be used entirely for Syria's ongoing military
buildup. Id. Egypt, in addition to acquiring substantial military assets from the
United States, is developing its own home-grown missile, the Saqr-80 (which can
be launched from FROG-7 launchers), while Iran is deploying its domestically-
produced Oghab missile. Id.
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might not serve Israel as an assured means of deterring enemy first-
strikes, they could function to support Israeli preemptions. Here,
Israel's adversaries-having suffered Israeli attacks on various hard
targets and military installations-would be deterred from retalia-
tion against the Jewish State by the threat (implicit or explicit) of
Israeli nuclear counterretaliation. It is conceivable, of course, that
this nuclear strategy could fail and that Israel's nuclear weapons
would then have to be used for actual warfighting. The only
military strategy capable of preventing this prospect altogether lies
in Israeli preemptive strikes involving nuclear weapons, a strategy
that would normally appear altogether inconceivable.
There seems to be only one contingency in which nuclear
warfighting options might appear cost-effective to Israel: to
prevent imminent destruction of the Third Temple.49 Faced with
this contingency, Israel would very likely threaten to use whatever
nuclear capability it had with the intention of carrying out the
threat. Should such threats be ignored, however, the resultant
nuclear destruction and societal disintegration in the region could
jeopardize Israel's continuance as a state, even though it had used
nuclear weapons only to stave off total annihilation.
If Israel were to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear
adversaries to prevent such annihilation, its continuance as a state
would also be jeopardized, in this case for political reasons. To
assess the credibility of an Israeli nuclear threat under conditions
of expected annihilation, one needs to understand the special
perspectives of Jewish history. Plainly, virtually all of Jewish Israel
would view any concerted effort to annihilate their country as more
than war.5° Rather, they would view such an effort as part of an
49. In Jewish-historical terms, the "Third Temple" refers to the current State
of Israel, and the "End of the Third Temple" signifies the destruction of this
current State. See Kitty 0. Cohen, Temple Mount Faithful-Amutah et. al v.
Attorney General Inspector-General of the Police May of Jerusalem Minister of
Education and Culture Director of the Antiquities Division Muslim WAQF, 45
CATH. U. L. REV. 861, 870 (1996). The first Jewish temple, and commonwealth,
was destroyed by the Babylonians (ancestors of contemporary Iraqis) in 587 B.C.
II Kings 25:1-11. The Second Temple was destroyed by the Romans in the year
70 A.D. Books of the Bible, THE NEW INDEXED BIBLE xxxiv (1929).
50. The author's assertion is drawn from the understanding that Israel is
presently the individual Jew in macrocosm, and that the current Arab/Islamic
effort to defeat Israel is simply a new form of historic hatreds and intentions.
Abortion of the Islamic world's genocidal hatreds and intentions directed against
"Jewish occupiers" predates even the creation of the State of Israel in 1948 in this
author's opinion.
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ongoing process of genocide in spite of the historical variation in
perpetrators.5 1
If the territories become Palestine, will Israel be more or less
inclined to prepare for nuclear warfighting? Extrapolating from
what we have already assumed, insofar as the creation of another
hostile Arab state and another "hot" border would heighten the
prospect of catastrophic war against the Jewish state, it is almost
certain that Israel would be substantially more dependent upon its
nuclear capabilities. Whether such capabilities would be put to
better use as part of an "assured destruction" or countervalue
strategy (MAD) or a "counterforce" (warfighting) strategy remains
to be calculated.
If, for example, Israel were to remain satisfied with developing
the relatively inaccurate apparatus of an "assured destruction"
posture,52 it could limit the prospect of enemy first-strikes. And
51. Jurisprudentially, therefore, we are also speaking here of what is
commonly known as "Crimes against humanity." For definition of such crimes,
see Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals
of the European Axis Powers and Charter of the International Military Tribunal,
Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 279. The principles of international law
recognized by the Charter of the Nirnberg Tribunal and the judgment of the
Tribunal were affirmed by the U.N. General Assembly as Affirmation of the
Principles of International Law Recognized by the Charter of the Niirnberg
Tribunal, adopted by the U.N. General Assembly, Dec. 11, 1946. G.A. Res. 95 (I),
U.N. GAOR at 1144, U.N. Doc. A/236 (1946). This Affirmation of the Principles
of International Law Recognized by the Charter of the Nirnberg Tribunal (1946)
was followed by General Assembly Resolution 177 (II), adopted Nov. 21, 1947,
directing the U.N. International Law Commission to "(a) Formulate the principles
of international law recognized in the Charter of the Nlirnberg Tribunal and in the
judgment of the Tribunal, and (b) Prepare a draft code of offences against the
peace and security of mankind. . . ." (See U.N. Doc. A/519, p. 112). The
principles formulated are known as the Principles of International Law Recognized
in the Charter and Judgment of the Nuremberg Tribunal. Report of the
International Law Commission, 2d Sess., U.N. GAOR, 5th Sess., Supp. No. 12, at
11 A/1316 (1950).
52. "Assured destruction" refers to the ability to inflict an "unacceptable"
degree of damage upon an attacker after absorbing any first strike. See Louis
RENt BERES, APOCALYPSE: NUCLEAR CATASTROPHE IN WORLD POLITICS
(1980). Mutual assured destruction (MAD) describes a condition in which an
assured destruction capability is possessed by opposing sides. Id. Counterforce
strategies are those which target an adversary's strategic military facilities and
supporting infrastructure. Id. Such strategies may be dangerous not only because
of the "collateral damage" they might produce, but also because they may
heighten the likelihood of first-strike attacks. Id. In this connection, collateral
damage refers to the damage done to human and non-human resources as a
consequence of strategic strikes directed at enemy forces or at military facilities.
Id. This "unintended" damage could involve large numbers of casualties and
fatalities.
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this prospect might be limited further if the assured destruction
posture were accompanied by public and fairly precise disclosure
of Israel's nonthreatening nuclear stance. Atthe same time, should
this posture fail to deter concerted enemy first-strikes, its intrinsic
damage-limiting inferiority to a developed counterforce capability
would produce much larger casualty figures and even a possible
end to the Third Temple.
If, on the other hand, Israel were to start off with a declared
nuclear warfighting posture, Arab perceptions of inevitable war
with Israel could be enlarged. With such perceptions, enemy
leaders would have to decide whether or not it would be more
gainful to await an Israeli preemption or to strike first themselves.
In the final analysis, this decision would be contingent on, inter alia,
the condition of inter-Arab and Arab/Iranian cooperation. 3
How might Israel choose in the aftermath of surrendering the
territories?54 If it should opt for nuclear deterrence based on
assured destruction, it would run the risk of "losing" any nuclear
war that might arise. If, on the other hand, it should choose
counterforce, the Arabs/Iranians would feel especially threatened,
a condition that could heighten the actual prospect of nuclear
weapons use.
53. See, e.g., Fouad Ajami, The End of Pan-Arabism, FOREIGN AFF., Winter,
1978-79, at 355-73. This decision could also be contingent, to a considerable
extent, upon the related but anti-Arab nationalism of pan-Arabism
54. For earlier discussions of such policy choices by this author, see generally
Louis Rend Beres, Striking 'First': Israel's Post-Gulf War Options Under
International Law, 14 Loy. L.A. INT'L & Comp. L.J. 1 (1991); Louis Rend Beres,
Israel's Destruction of Iraq's Nuclear Reactor, XXXVII MIDSTREAM 8 (1991);
Louis Rend Beres, After the Gulf War: Israel, Palestine and the Risk of Nuclear
War in the Middle East, XIX STRATEGIC REV. 48 (1991); Louis Rend Beres, The
Question of Palestine and Israel's Nuclear Strategy, 62 POL. Q. 451-60 Oct./Dec.
1991; Louis Rend Beres, A Palestine State and Israel's Nuclear Strategy, 31
CROSSROADS: AN INT'L SOCIO-POL. J. 97-104 (1991); Louis Rend Beres, Israel,
Palestine and Regional Nuclear War, 22 BULL. OF PEACE PROPOSALS 227-34
(1991); Louis Rend Beres, A Palestinian State - Implications for Israel's Security
and the Possibility of Nuclear War, 4 BULL. OF THE JERUSALEM INST. FOR W.
DEF. 3-10 (Oct. 1991); Louis Rend Beres, Israeli Security in a Changing World,
XVIII STRATEGIC REV. 11-22 (Fall 1990); Louis Rend Beres, Palestine and
Nuclear War, JERUSALEM REP., Aug. 1, 1991, at 45; Louis Rend Beres, Israeli
Nuclear Strategy, INT'L STUDIES NOTES, Spring (1990); Louis Rend Beres, The
Growing Threat of Nuclear War in the Middle East, 12 JERUSALEM J. INT'L REL.
1-27 (1990); Louis Rend Beres, Staring Down the Specter of Nuclear War, 2
ISRAELI DEMOCRACY, 44-48 (Sunmer/Fall 1988); Louis Rend Beres, Perils of
Nuclearism, 15 PRESENT TENSE 60 (Sept./Oct. 1988); Louis Rend Beres, Nuclear
Weapons and Nuclear War in the Middle East, 12 TRANSNAT'L PERSP. 8-13 (1986);
Louis Rend Beres, Israel, Force and International Law: Assessing Anticipatory Self-
Defense, 13 JERUSALEM J.INT'L REL. 1-14 (1991).
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One factor that would influence this decision is the type and
number of nuclear weapons required. A relatively small number
of nuclear weapons are needed for assured destruction. These
weapons, of course, with only "countervalue" objectives, might be
inaccurate.
A counterforce or warfighting objective, on the other hand,
would require a larger number of far more accurate weapons, ones
that could destroy even the most hardened targets. To a certain
extent, "going for counterforce" could make Israeli nuclear threats
more credible. This is based on the assumption that because the
effects of such warfighting weapons would be more precise and
controlled, they would be more amenable to actual use.
Yet, as previously discussed, warfighting postures are apt to
encourage preemption.15  And if counterforce-targeted nuclear
weapons are ever fired, especially in a proliferated regional setting,
the resultant escalation could still produce extensive countervalue
exchanges. Indeed, even if such escalation were averted, the so-
called "collateral" effects of counterforce detonations could still be
devastating.
In making its nuclear choices, Israel will have to confront a
paradox: Credible nuclear deterrence, essential to security and
survival in a world made more dangerous by the creation of
Palestine, would require "usable" nuclear weapons. If, after all,
these weapons were obviously inappropriate for any reasonable
objective, they would not deter. At the same time, the more usable
the weapons become in order to enhance nuclear deterrence, the
more likely it is that, at one time or another, they will actually be
fired. While this paradox would seem to suggest the rationality of
deploying the least-harmful forms of usable nuclear weapons, the
fact that there would be no coordinated agreements with enemy
states on deployable nuclear weapons points to a conclusion.
Unless Israel calculates that the more harmful weapons would
produce greater hazards for its own population as well as for target
countries, there would be no tactical benefit to opting for the least
injurious usable weapons.
All things considered, Israel-if confronted by a new state of
Palestine-would be well-advised to do everything possible to
prevent the appearance of Arab or Iranian nuclear powers,56
55. See supra text accompanying notes 24-27.
56. This was done, of course, in the June 1981 attack on the Baghdad nuclear
reactor. See Louis Ren6 Beres & Tsiddon-Chatto, Reconsidering Israel's
Destruction of Iraq's Osiraq Nuclear Reactor, 9 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 437
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including pertinent non-nuclear preemptions. Bringing its own
bomb out of the basement is unlikely to serve any serious purpose
unless Jerusalem were to conclude that enemy intractability toward
the Jewish state had become overt and overwhelming and that
preparations for nuclearization in particular Arab states and/or Iran
could no longer be stopped, even by Israeli preemptive strikes.57
Under these very portentous conditions, Israel would require a very
believable (and hence usable) nuclear deterrent, one that could be
employed without igniting Armageddon for all regional belligerents
and one that could serve some damage-limiting military purpose
(whatever the collateral effects) against enemy weapons (nuclear
and non-nuclear) if deterrence should fail.
Although it is highly unlikely that Israel would choose to use
high-yield nuclear explosives that would produce indiscriminate
casualties and fatalities throughout the region (including perhaps
radioactive fallout within Israel itself), it may be reasonable to use
low-yield, "small" nuclear explosives. In this connection, Israel
might choose to use enhanced-radiation weapons rather than
nuclear explosives (weapons that have been referred to by the
strategic community as the "neutron bomb"). The neutron bomb,
or ER warhead, (deliverable by artillery shells or missile warheads)
is a relatively small thermonuclear weapon that is designed to
minimize the fraction of energy going into blast and heat.5" Upon
detonating, large quantities of radioactive neutrons would be
(1995). For information on Israel's attack on Osiraq; See H. Grumm, Safeguards
and Tammuz: Setting the Record Straight, 23 IAEA BULL. 10-14 (Dec. 1981); Shai
Feldman, The Bombing of Osiraq revisited, 7 INT'L SECURITY 114-42 (Fall 1982);
and Roger F. Pajak, Nuclear Status and Policies of the Middle East Countries, 59
INT'L AFF. 596-600 (1983). Saddam Hussein's reactor, named Osiraq by France
(which had supplied the reactor "for peaceful purposes") was changed by Iraq to
Tammuz, a Babylonian god. The project was even coded as Tammuz 17, a
reference to the day in 587 B.C. when the army of Nebuchadnezzar broke through
the walls of Jerusalem.
57. In this connection, the author recognizes that neutralization of Iraqi
nuclear potential was not achieved entirely by the Gulf War. On Oct. 7, 1991,
more than seven months after conclusion of hostilities, United Nations inspectors
discovered a complex of buildings that served as the nerve center of Saddam
Hussein's covert nuclear weapons program, but had escaped allied attack during
the war. See Efraim Karsh, et al., Arms Control and the New Middle Eastern
Environment, 12 DEF. ANALYSIS 33, 38 (1996). It was here, at an installation
called Al Atheer about 40 miles south of Baghdad, that Iraq planned, according
to the report, "to design and produce a nuclear device." See Paul Lewis, U.N.
Aides Discover Atom Arms Center Concealed by Iraq, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 1991,
at Al, A7.
58. See Louis RENd BERES, MIMICKING SISYPHUS: AMERICA'S COUNTER-
VAILING NUCLEAR STRATEGY, supra note 29, at 72.
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released, killing people but leaving buildings and other structures
unaffected. 9
Because such a weapon could be used with less "Armageddon
potential" than other kinds of nuclear weapons, it may appear more
reasonable to use. At the same time, because the "spillover"
effects upon the using state could be as harmful as those of other
nuclear weapons, the reasonableness of using the neutron bomb
may be contingent, in the final analysis, on prevailing winds and
weather conditions.' Enhanced radiation warheads would
produce appreciable fallout from the fission trigger (the neutron
bomb is triggered by a minimum-yield fission explosion) and their
critical effect would be death spawned by intense radiation.61
In its decisions concerning nuclear weapons, however,
Jerusalem will have to look far beyond tactical military calculations
toward long-term political considerations. With such a view,
Israel's leaders will doubtlessly discover that the weight of
international opinion, both official and public, is now more strongly
arrayed against nuclear weapons than ever before, and that a world
led by a denuclearizing super-power would be enormously hostile
to any first-use of nuclear arms in the Middle East. This does not
mean that Jerusalem will likely reason that matters of negative
world public opinion should override expectations of national
survival, but it does suggest that, given sufficient incentives, Israel's
leaders will be anxious to do everything possible to avoid nuclear
battles in the region. At this precarious moment in history, the
most obvious and important of these incentives would be general
agreement among all parties to the conflict-interstate and
intercommunal-that the territories should not be transformed into
an independent Arab state of Palestine.
59. See generally LOUIS RENt BERES, APOCALYPSE: NUCLEAR CATASTROPHE
IN WORLD POLITICS, supra note 29, at 148-50, 172 (discussing the effects of
enhanced radiation weapons). The neutron bomb, which falls under the category
of "enhanced radiation weapons," releases large quantities of radioactive neutrons
which are effective in killing people while leaving buildings intact. See id.
Exploded 130 yards in the air, a neutron bomb would kill instantly anyone within
a half-mile radius, and cause delayed deaths for people within a one-mile radius.
See id. Because of its extraordinary precision, the neutron bomb erodes the
distinction between conventional and nuclear conflict. See id.
60. See id.
61. See id.
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IV. International Law and the History of Palestine
This geostrategic conclusion is reinforced by international law.
Contrary to widely-accepted notions, proprietary right to the
territories rests with Israel, at least for the moment.62 Although
Israel has a peremptory and reciprocal obligation to ensure Arab
human rights throughout pertinent parts of Judea/Samaria (West
Bank) and Gaza, its claim to sovereignty is founded upon settled
historical developments and upon the unequivocal right to
endure.63
62. See, e.g., JOAN PETERS, SINCE TIME IMMEMORIAL, supra note 51. It must
also be kept in mind that Judea/Samaria/Gaza came under Israel's control in 1967
after a war of aggression planned by front-line Arab states. When the Jews
accepted the United States plan for the partition of Palestine in 1947-a plan
which would have placed these territories under Palestinian control-the reaction
of the Arab world was one of total rejection. The UN Special Commission was
appointed in 1947 to investigate the situation in Palestine and to recommend
action to the UN General Assembly. THE ISRAEL-ARAB READER 91 (Walter
Laqueur & Barry Rubin eds., 1995). The commission was known as the United
Nations Special Committee on Palestine (U.N.S.C.O.P.). Id. The UN General
Assembly's Resolution 181 adopted the majority recommendation of the
U.N.S.C.O.P. Report, which was passed on Nov. 29, 1947, by a vote of 33-13. Id.
63. Regarding this right, it is held authoritatively under international law that
a state need not ever be bound by agreements that threaten its very survival.
According to Thomas Jefferson, in his Opinion on the French Treaties (Apr. 28,
1793), in THE POLITICAL WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 113-14 (Merrill D.
Peterson ed., 1993), "[t]he nation itself, bound necessarily to whatever it's
preservation and safety require, cannot enter into engagements contrary to it's
indispensable obligations." Id. at 115. Citing to Grotius, Pufendorff, and Wolf,
that "treaties remain obligatory notwithstanding any change in the form of
government, except in the single case where the preservation of that form was the
object of the treaty." Id. at 114. Jefferson further states:
Compacts then between nation & nation are obligatory on them
by the same moral law which obliges individuals to observe
their compacts. There are circumstances however which
sometimes excuse the non-performance of contracts between
man & man: so are there also between nation & nation. When
performance, for instance, becomes impossible, non-perfor-
mance is not immoral. So if performance becomes self-destruc-
tive to the party, the law of self-preservation overrules the laws
of obligation to others.
Id. (emphasis in original).
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A. The Owners and Inhabitants of Palestine
As a legal entity, Palestine ceased to exist in 1948, when Great
Britain relinquished its League of Nations mandate.' Prior to
that decisive moment in history, which was followed by Israel's
declaration of independence on May 14, 1948, Palestine had never
existed as an independent sovereign state.65 When the West Bank
came under the illegal control of Jordan and Gaza under the illegal
control of Egypt during the 1948-1949 war of independence, these
Arab states did not put an end to a pre-existing state.66
From the Biblical period (ca. 1350 B.C. to 586 B.C.) to the
British Mandate (1918-1948), the land named by the Romans after
the ancient Philistines was controlled by a large number of non-
Palestinian forces. 67  Significantly, a continuous chain of Jewish
possession of the land was recognized after World War I at the San
Remo Peace Conference of April 1920.6' A treaty signed at this
Conference which gave Great Britain mandatory authority over
Palestine, in order to prepare it to become the "national home for
the Jewish people. '' 69 Palestine, according to the treaty, comprised
territories encompassing what are now the states of Jordan and
Israel, including West Bank (Judea and Samaria) and Gaza.7"
Present day Israel, including West Bank and Gaza, comprises only
twenty-two percent of Palestine, as defined and ratified at the San
Remo Peace Conference.71
In 1922, Great Britain unilaterally and illegally split off
seventy-eight percent of Palestine-all of Palestine east of the
Jordan River-and gave it to Abdullah, the non-Palestinian son of
64. See THE MIDDLE E. CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY, Seventh Edition
(1990) at 12-13.
65. See generally id. Nevertheless, the Palestine National Council declared the
establishment of an independent Palestinian state at its November 15, 1988,
meeting in Algiers. For the text of this declaration, see id. at 310. The declaration
did not satisfy the generally-accepted criteria for statehood identified under
international law; control over a fixed and clearly-defined territory; a population;
a government; and the capacity to engage in diplomatic and foreign relations. See
Convention on Rights and Duties of States, Dec. 26, 1933, T.S. No. 881, 165
L.N.T.S. 19, Article 1.
66. See THE MIDDLE E., supra note 64, at 13, 16.
67. See PETERS, supra note 50.
68. See generally THE MIDDLE E., supra note 62.
69. See generally id.
70. See generally id.
71. See generally id.
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the Sharif of Mecca.72 Thereafter, in 1947, rather than designate
the entire land west of the Jordan River as the Jewish national
homeland, the newly-formed United Nations enacted a second
partition.73 Ironically, because the second fission again gave unfair
advantage to the Arabs, Jewish leaders accepted the judgment
while Arab states did not.7' On May 15, 1948, exactly one day
after the State of Israel came into existence, Azzam Pasha,
Secretary General of the Arab League, declared: "This will be a
war of extermination and momentous massacre ...,7 This
declaration, of course, has been at the heart of all subsequent Arab
policies toward Israel.76 Almost twenty years after Israel's entry
into the community of sovereign states, the Jewish state-as a
result of its victory against Arab aggressor states-has gained
control over West Bank and Gaza.77 Although the idea of the
inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war was enshrined
in the U.N. Charter,78 there existed no authoritative sovereign to
whom the territories could be "returned." In this connection, Israel
could hardly be expected to transfer the territories back to Jordan
and Egypt, which had exercised illegal control since the Arab-
initiated war of aggression in 1948. Moreover, the idea of
Palestinian self-determination was just beginning to emerge and
was not even codified in the pertinent United Nations Security
Council Resolution7 9 (#242; adopted on November 22, 1967).
72. See generally id.
73. See generally id.
74. See generally THE MIDDLE E., supra note 62.
75. See Isi LEIBLER, THE CASE FOR ISRAEL 15 (1972); see also Louis Ren6
Beres & Yosah Tsiddon-Chatto, Reconsidering Israel's Destruction of Iraq's Osiraq
Nuclear Reactor: A Rejoinder, 9 TEMP. INT'L & COMp. L.J. 449 (1995).
76. It is the author's observation that from 1948 onward, Arab states have
threatened Israel at all levels. For example, the PLO Covenant's call for Israel's
"extermination"-Oslo Accords notwithstanding-has never been abrogated.
Israel remains denounced, as it always has been, as an instrument of evil, by the
fact that she rose on a foundation of evil. Y. HARKABI, ARAB ATTITUDES
TOWARD ISRAEL 307-10 (1972). For The Palestinian National Charter, see THE
ISRAEL-ARAB READER, supra note 62, at 218-22. On the ongoing preparations
for war against Israel, by both the Arab states and the PA/PLO, see U.S. House
of Representatives Task Force on Terrorism & Unconventional Warfare,
Approaching the New Cycle of Arab-Israeli Fighting, Dec. 10, 1996,
<http.//www.emet.com/report.htm>.
77. See THE MIDDLE E., supra, note 64, at 18-22.
78. See CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS. Done at San Francisco, June 26,
1945. Entered into force Oct. 24, 1945; for the United States, Oct. 24, 1945, 59
Stat. 1031, T.S. No. 993, 3 Bevans 1153, 1976 Y.B.U.N. 1043.
79. See Resolution 242 (1967) of Nov. 22, 1967.
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The Arab states convened a summit in Khartoum, in August,
1967, concluding that "there would be [n]o peace with Israel, no
recognition of Israel, no negotiations with it, and insistence on the
rights of the Palestinian people in their own country., 8' Although
Security Council Resolution 242 links the establishment of peace
with Israeli withdrawal from the territories, no insistence on direct
negotiations among the hostile parties is mandated by the text.8'
Resolution 242 does not require Israel to withdraw from each of
the territories it came to control in 1967-control stemming not
from a war of aggression, but from a legitimate war of self-defense.82
In 1979, when Egypt made peace with Israel, Egypt received
the Sinai in return-land constituting over ninety percent of the
territory taken by Israel in 1967.83
80. See CHAIM HERZOG, THE ARAB-ISRAELI WARS: WAR AND PEACE IN THE
MIDDLE EAST FROM THE WAR OF INDEPENDENCE THROUGH LEBANON 191
(1982).
81. See Resolution 242 (1967) of Nov. 22, 1967; KAREL C. WELLENS,
RESOLUTIONS AND STATEMENTS OF THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL
(1946-1989) 454 (1990).
82. The right to self-defense is well-established in contemporary international
law-both the right of post-attack self-defense, codified at Article 51 of the U.N.
Charter, and the long-standing, customary right of anticipatory self-defense. Since
World War II, aggression has defined a military attack directed against the
territory of another state which is not justified under international law. The Arab
nations, however, persistently rejected these obligations. The question of defining
aggression first acquired significance with the Draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance
of 1923 (see Report of the Permanent Advisory Commission of the League of
Nations, L.N.O. 7, Spec. Suppl. No. 16, 1923).
By a resolution of Nov. 17, 1950, the U.N. General Assembly decided to refer
a proposal of the U.S.S.R. concerning the definition of aggression to the
International Law Commission. See Resolution 378B, V, Soviet proposal: Off.
Recs. Gen. Assem., 5th Sess. Annexes, agenda item 72, p. 4; A/C. 1/608. An
authoritative definition of aggression was adopted without a vote by the U.N.
General Assembly as Resolution 3314 (XXIX) on Dec. 14, 1974. Article 1 enjoins
members to refrain from "the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity
or political independence of any state .. " It also emerges in the definition that
the first use of armed force represents prima facie evidence of unlawful conduct,
but that "other relevant circumstances" may also be taken into account. The
requirements that the first use of force, to qualify as aggression, must be "in
contravention of the Charter" clarifies that there may exist some first uses of force
that are entirely legal and defensive. It follows, inter alia, that the use of force, to
qualify as aggression, must be carried out to achieve a prohibited objective (i.e.,
that animus aggressionis is an essential element of the offense). With particular
reference to Israel, this suggests that preemptive attacks which only seek to
forestall annihilation of the Jewish state (acts of anticipatory self-defense) and
which comply with the expectations of humanitarian international law, may be
altogether lawful and law enforcing.
83. For full text of Camp David Agreements, dated Sept. 17, 1978, see THE
ARAB-ISRAELI READER supra note 62, at 409-10. For full text of Egypt-Israel
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Resolution 242 has been generally misinterpreted. The
formula envisioned by the Resolution is one of "peace for land,"
not "land for peace."'  The Resolution grants to every state in
the Middle East "the right to live in peace within secure and
recognized boundaries."85  It points, therefore, to peace before
territorial withdrawal to "recognized boundaries. 8 6  The 1978
Camp David Accords stipulated that negotiations on the final status
of the West Bank and Gaza Strip must address the "legitimate
rights" of its Arab inhabitants.' But these legitimate rights do
not include the right to establish another Arab state, especially as
that state would likely be established upon the intended ruins of
the State of Israel.
B. Security Council Resolution 242
Security Council Resolution 242 is "a balanced whole,"
according to Lord Caradon of Great Britain, its sponsor.88 "To
add to it, or to detract from it would destroy the balance ... It
must be considered as a whole and as it stands., 89  Considering
the text, the "right of self-determination of the Palestinians" does
not appear in the Resolution, an international conference is never
mentioned, the parties referred to include only states, and the
Peace Treaty (Mar. 26, 1979), see id. at 409-10. Although it is generally believed
that the peace treaty in force with Egypt constrains Egypt from joining with other
Arab forces against Israel, this belief is incorrect. A minute to Article VI,
paragraph 5, of the Israel-Egypt Peace Treaty provides that it is agreed by the
parties that there is no assertion that the Peace Treaty provides that it is agreed
by the parties that there is no assertion that the Peace Treaty prevails over other
treaties or agreements, or that other treaties or agreements prevail over the peace
Treaty. This means that the Treaty with Israel does not prevail over the defense
treaties that Egypt has concluded with Syria, and that Cairo-should it determine
that Israel has undertaken "aggression" against Syria--could enter permissibly into
belligerency against Israel on behalf of Damascus. Indeed, it is the author's
opinion that there is reason to believe that even if Syria were to commence
hostilities against Israel to recover the Golan Heights, Egypt might abrogate its
agreement with Israel and offer military assistance to Syria. Shortly after the
Israel-Egypt Peace Treaty was signed, then Egyptian Prime Minister Khalil stated
that he would regard any attempt by Syria to recover the Golan Heights as a
defensive war, one that would bring into play the Egypt-Syrian Peace Treaty. For
terms of the pertinent treaties, see Treaty of Peace, Mar. 26, 1979, Egypt-Israel,
Minute to Art. VI(5), 18 I.L.M. 362, 392; and Joint Defense Agreement Between
Syria and Egypt, Oct. 20, 1955, 227 U.N.T.S., 126.
84. See Res. 242 (1967), supra note 79.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. See Camp David Agreements, supra note 83.
88. Id.
89. Id.
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phrase "territories occupied" is neither preceded by "the," nor is
it followed by "on all fronts."'  Finally, 242 specifically mentions
withdrawal only of Israel's armed forces, not of its administrative
apparatus or sovereign control.91
Israel's current right to reject the idea of the territories as
"occupied" also stems from its incontrovertible right to security.
Because transformation of these lands into an Arab state of
Palestine would threaten the very existence of the Third Temple,
Israel is under no obligation to transfer West Bank and Gaza to
another sovereign authority especially as the extant Arab states,
together with Iran, persistently call for "elimination" or "liquida-
tion" of the "Zionist entity.
9 2
International law is not a suicide pact. Moreover, Israel's
jurisprudential rights to security are reinforced, as we have seen, by
compelling geostrategic expectations.93 Transformation of the
territories into another enemy Arab state, therefore, would
represent neither the fulfillment of binding legal requirements nor
the creation of a tolerable, benign neighbor. Rather, the creation
of an independent state of Palestine would signal the end of Israel's
most peremptory right-the right to physical survival-and a
greatly heightened prospect of regional nuclear war. It should be
widely understood that this prospect would impact all peoples in
the affected area, including Christian, Muslim and Arabs as well as
Jews.
90. Id.
91. See Res. 242 (1967), supra note 79.
92. See HARKABI, supra note 76, at 307-11.
93. It is the author's belief that these expectations are based upon explicit and
persistent Arab/Islamic commitments to destroy Israel. See U.S. House of
Representatives Task Force on Terrorism and Unconventional Warfare, supra note
76. Further, the PLO remains unwilling to amend its Covenant provisions to
destroy the State of Israel. In his exchange of letters with Prime Minister Yitzhak
Rabin on Sept. 9, 1993, at the beginning of the Oslo Process, Yasser Arafat
undertook a commitment to amend the PLO Covenant. Two years later, the
Covenant had still not been changed, but a deadline was fixed in the Interim
Agreement (Oslo 2) of Sept. 28, 1995. Under Oslo 2, the PLO was obligated to
change the Covenant no later that two months after the inauguration of the
elected Palestinian Council. Since the council was inaugurated on Mar. 7, 1996,
the deadline for the PLO to amend the Covenant was May 7, 1996. On several
occasions, the Palestinians have asserted that a legal committee was working on
a new draft of the document. To date, no new version of the Covenant has been
submitted to the Palestine National Council (PNC). See Amending the Covenant:
An Unfulfilled Commitment, Israel Government Press Office (Jan. 26, 1995),
imra@netvision.net.il.
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V. The Effects of Territorial Loss on Israel as a "System"
Israel, as in the case of all states, is best understood as a
"system." If this system were to suffer a nuclear terrorist "insult,"
the overall "organismic" threat would be substantial. Here, sensing
the enormous weakening of an adversary by higher-order terrorism,
certain Arab/Islamic states likely would be encouraged to resort to
more-or-less full-scale war.94
One way in which the Peace Process might generate nuclear
terrorism against Israel would be via its ongoing legitimization of
various terrorist groups. For example, when the Clinton Adminis-
tration prodded Jerusalem to enter into the Oslo Process and
proceeded to host Israel's formal agreement with the PLO on
September 13, 1993,9" it instantly transformed Yasser Arafat and
his terrorist network into a jurisprudentially and politically
acceptable organization. Such diplomatic actions could give aid and
comfort to terrorist groups, making it easier for- them to ultimately
gain access to the essential implements of nuclear terrorist attack.
Under the terms of the Peace Process, Israel's legitimization of
terrorist groups is paralleling Israel's loss of strategic depth. In this
situation, terrorists may draw encouragement from both the
palpable weakening of Israeli power (a weakening that could
inspire death-blow forms of higher-order terrorist attack) and from
the idea that their ends justified their means.
The Peace Process is producing a Palestinian state. In this
connection, nuclear terrorist threats against Israel likely will
increase because, tactically, the sanctuary benefits of "Palestine"
will make it easier to plan and to carry out a nuclear terrorist
operation, and to regain all "lost territories" (i.e., all of Israel).
Although territorial loss may enhance Israel's nuclear deter-
rence of enemy states, it would assuredly not extend to deterrence
of terrorist enemies. While territorial loss would make the Jewish
State vastly more dependent upon nuclear weapons and to appear
more likely to actually use such weapons, further territorial loss
94. This argument flows from the assumption of many observers that certain
Arab/Islamic states maintain their commitment to destruction of Israel, and that-
tactically-they would be encouraged by a prior act of nuclear terrorism against
the Jewish State.
95. See Louis Rend Beres, Israel, The "Peace Process" and Nuclear Terrorism:
A Jurisprudential Perspective, 18 LoY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J., 767, 792 n.5
(1996).
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would have no positive effects on Israeli counternuclear terror-
ism.96 Because such counterterrorism could not be undertaken
with nuclear weapons, territorial loss under the Peace Process will
have an entirely negative effect on Israel's capacity to protect itself
from nuclear terrorism and, consequently, from nuclear war.
Based upon the concept of Israel as a "system," the integrity
and durability of the entire "organism" is dependent upon the
integrity and durability of each "organ" component. Although
certain "pathological insults" to the organism, by themselves, are
minor and not life-threatening, together, they can be astoundingly
debilitating, even lethal.
For now, the Israeli "organism" is still able to deal with
ongoing, conventional terrorist attacks without suffering existential
harms.97 By themselves, these attacks, however odious and
demoralizing, will not portend enemy victory. Over time, however,
these attacks may occasion such far-reaching levels of apprehen-
sion, instability and despair within Israel that the state itself will
become "unglued." If this should happen, the cumulative impact
of non life-threatening instances of anti-Israel terror may become
life-threatening. Aware of the Peace Process's "productive"
consequences, Israel's Islamic terrorist enemies may calculate that
their resort to nuclear terrorism had become distinctly cost-
effective.
When assessing the Peace Process's probable effects on anti-
Israel nuclear terrorism, scholars and planners should be attentive
to pertinent intervening variables that could affect hypothesized
relationships. Examples of such intervening variables include: (1)
changes in the configuration of state and non-state participants in
the Peace Process;9" (2) changes in the nuclear status of state
participants in the Peace Process;99 (3) changes in the number of
nuclear adversary states in the region, whether or not these states
are participants in the Peace Process;1  (4) changes of leadership
96. This means that Israel could not possibly exploit its nuclear weapons to
prevent anti-Israel nuclear terrorism.
97. This suggests to the author that, at least until now, conventional terrorist
attacks have not been intrinsically destructive enough to destabilize Israel, and that
such attacks have not been sufficiently harmful to provide incentives to enemy
states to strike first.
98. By this, the author means any change in the particular state and non-state
players in the Peace Process.
99. By this, the author means any change in the nuclear weapons status of any
state involved in the Peace Process, e.g., in the future, Syria.
100. By this, the author means any nuclear weapons status change in the
regional enemy states facing Israel.
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in enemy terrorist groups;1"' (5) changes in relationships among
enemy terrorist groups; 2 (6) changes of leadership in enemy
states, whether or not these states are participants in the Peace
Process; °3 (7) changes in the incidence and/or intensity of anti-
Israel terrorism; " and (8) changes in the deployment of enemy
state nuclear weapons.10 5
Regarding this last "intervening variable," the Peace Process
may allow enemy states, once they have developed deployable
nuclear weapons, to place their weapons and launchers in areas that
would be extremely close to Israel's most populous cities and
towns. Recognizing the placement's strategic advantages, enemy
states and terrorist groups may forge formal or informal alignments
against the Jewish State, stipulating joint and collaborative nuclear
action. Nuclear terrorism may give rise to nuclear war; nuclear war
may give rise to nuclear terrorism; or nuclear terrorism and nuclear
war may be undertaken against Israel simultaneously, a "synergis-
tic" attack or set of attacks with potentially catastrophic harms.
101. By this, the author means any change in the leadership, primarily, of
PA/PLO; Hamas, Islamic Jihad and Hezbollah. For example, a displacement of
Arafat by a more radical Islamic leader in PA/PLO could have a substantial effect
on the outcome of the Peace Process.
102. By this, the author means any changes in the relations between these
groups, e.g., any change in the relationship between PA/PLO and Hamas. Various
PLO/Hamas deals have been reported periodically in the press. For example, OC
Intelligence, Maj. Gen. Moshe Ya'alon, indicated in October 1995 that the PA had
"reached an agreement with Hamas on suspending terror attacks against Israel
from the autonomous areas .. ." Hamas-PA Deal Reported, JERUSALEM POST
INT'L ED., Oct. 28, 1995, at 6.
103. By this, the author means any changes in Arab/Islamic leadership in the
region.
104. By this, the author means any increase/decrease in anti-Israel terrorism
and/or increase/decrease in the "quality" of anti-Israel terrorism.
105. By this, the author means any changes in the way enemy state nuclear
weapons are deployed, e.g., changes from counterforce to countervalue targeting.
For now, as mentioned earlier, there are still no nuclear weapons states among
Israel's enemies. But Israel will have to be careful and prudent. See generally
BEKER, supra note 18. See also, Peter Sullivan, Iraq's Enduring Proliferation
Threat, 95 STRATEGIC FORUM, Nat'l Defense Univ., Nov. 1996, at 4; and Inbar,
supra note 11, at 64. Regarding the unconventional threat from Iran, the
Jordanian Publication, ALL HAYAT, in its Oct. 19, 1996 edition, stated: "Western
intelligence reports note that Iran will succeed within one year to manufacture
catastrophic nerve gas. If Iran produces such gas, the Gulf States will be in danger
and this will threaten the stability of the Middle East." See imra@netvision.net.il,
Oct. 22, 1996.
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VI. Conclusion
Despite its name, the Middle East Peace Process is leading
directly and indirectly toward war. Faced with a new enemy state
called "Palestine," Israel-now deprived of sorely-needed strategic
depth-will expand its reliance upon nuclear weapons and strategy.
Moreover, this expanded reliance will likely encourage preemption
on all sides and increase the risks of inadvertent/unauthorized/
accidental nuclear wars. Furthermore, if Israel's leaders perceive
an authentically existential threat to Third Temple Commonwealth
survival, they could decide to undertake nuclear retaliation, nuclear
counterretaliation, nuclear preemption and even nuclear war-
fighting.
As we have seen, the Peace Process also threatens Israel's
survival indirectly. Here, by enlarging the risks of nuclear
terrorism, Oslo expectations are setting the stage for a dramatically
weakened national "organism," one that would provide a most
tempting target for enemy states inflamed by the prospect of Israeli
defeat. Following the creation of an Oslo-directed Palestinian
state, Israel's state and nonstate enemies will likely recognize the
synergistic1" benefits of nuclear terrorism and nuclear war.
Quo Vadis? Where should Israel go from here? If the
government in Jerusalem were to back away from Oslo commit-
ments to creation of a Palestinian state, Israel would face global
condemnation, renewed terrorism (possibly even unconventional
106. Here the concept of "synergy" is used by the author to point to what
military planners normally call "wars of attrition" and "wars of annihilation." A
war of attrition is a condition of belligerency designed to wear down an enemy by
constant pressure in order to weaken, exhaust or destroy that enemy's forces. The
word "attrition" derives from the Latin attere (to weaken) that comes from terrere
(to rub). In the particular sense of current Arab/Islamic war against Israel, the
objective of exhausting or destroying Israel's armed forces (IDF) is only an
intermediate goal. The overriding objective of this war is annihilation of the State
of Israel. For more specialized treatment of the concept, war of attrition, see
Dermot Bradley, War of Attrition, in 6 INT'L MILITARY & DEF. ENCYCLOPEDIA
2902-06 (Trevor N. Dupuy ed., 1993). In the orthodox military sense, the term
annihilation "is not synonymous with its nonmilitary sense of complete destruc-
tion." Rather, it means "to take action that causes an enemy force to be totally
incapable of further resistance." See id. at 2902. In the particular context of
Arab/Islamic war against Israel, however, annihilation is synonymous with the
nonmilitary meaning of complete and utter devastation. It is such devastation, not
"merely" the incapacitation of Israel's armed forces, that Israel's enemies (state
and non-state) seek. Although very few military forces in history have been
annihilated in the nonmilitary sense, a prominent exception is the Jewish army at
Masada in 73 C.E.- shortly after the destruction of the Second Temple.
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terrorism) and war (possibly even unconventional war" ). If this
government moves forward to accept fully a new state of Palestine,
Israel would face renewed terrorism and war.
In essence, the Peace Process has given the Jewish State a lose-
lose choice. There are nuanced differences, of course, but in the
final analysis the issue of Palestinian independence-however it
may be resolved-points only toward violence and conflict. In
principle, Israel could seek some measures of security via certain
combinations of selective preemption against pertinent hard-targets
and selective deployments of Anti-Tactical Ballistic Missile
(ATBM) systems. In reality, the time for essential preemptions has
already passed (i.e., it is no longer feasible tactically) and even the
most effective active defenses will be inadequate for the protection
of Israel's "soft" target populations. l"
In reality, all of Israel's remaining options are not only
unattractive; they are also all intolerable. Of course, this is not
what one would normally expect from a "Peace Process," but the
Oslo Agreements were ill-fated for Israel from the start. Creating
a corrosive momentum all its own, this Process has now placed
Israel in an authentically unwinnable situation. Short of rescue by
a deus ex machina,'° Israel's current best hope for survival after
the Peace Process probably lies in ensuring the viability of both its
conventional and nuclear deterrents and in a corresponding
expansion of its counterterrorist and active defense capabilities.
107. From the author's observation, biological weapons may be somewhat less
threatening to Israel than chemical weapons or even nuclear weapons. Although
a growing number of states have or are currently developing capabilities to employ
living organisms (such as anthrax, lassa fever, or typhus, as opposed to inert
toxins), such capabilities have limited military value. This is because their
dispersal mechanisms are difficult to manage; a change of wind can make them as
lethal to the attacker as to the intended victim; and because it is difficult to sustain
the living organism in biological weapons in hot climates for long periods. At the
same time, precisely because biological weapons are better suited for mass
destruction than for use as dedicated military instruments, they could hold out
greater appeal to Israel's irrational enemies.
108. On the shortcomings of active defenses, see Richard L. Garwin, Space-
Based Defenses Against Ballistic Missiles, PSIS PROCEEDINGS, THE FUTuRE OF
SMART WEAPONS, Proceedings from an AAAS Annual Meeting Symposium, Feb.
8, 1992, at 45-55.
109. This remedy of a god "out of a machine" was a theatrical device of
Euripides. Born in Salamis around 485 B.C., this "father" of modem European
drama would often conclude a play by bringing forth a sort of crane, which hoisted
the actor representing a god above all of the other actors. Such appearance solved
endless complications and supplied a happy ending. It goes without saying that the
world of the contemporary Middle East is not the world of Euripides' theatrical
resolutions.
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